Showing posts with label injunction. Show all posts
Showing posts with label injunction. Show all posts

Sunday, September 23, 2012

Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction: Can it benefit everyone?


There is a common misunderstanding that a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction may benefit even those who are not parties to the suit. On the contrary however, TRO/preliminary injunction, as a general rule, is in personam only and can bind only those who are parties to the litigation. In that regard, only the applicant/s for TRO/injunction can seek the court’s protection.

In the case of Pineda v. Santiago, “the INK sought from the RTC a second alias writ of execution to implement the judgment in Calalang against Conrado Pineda (Pineda), et. al.  In opposing the issuance of such writ, Pineda, et al., asserted that they held titles to Lot 671 adverse to those of Lucia and INK and that they were not parties in De la Cruz or in Calalang.  In its assailed order, the RTC granted the second alias writ of execution on the basis that the issue of ownership of Lot 671 was already determined with finality in favor of Lucia and INK.  The writ ordered the deputy sheriff to eject Pineda, et al., from Lot 671.  When the matter was brought before us (the Supreme Court), we annulled the assailed order as the writ of execution issued was against Pineda, et al., who were not parties to Civil Case No. Q-45767, the ejectment suit instituted by De Leon, et al.  We elaborated in Pineda that:

Being a suit for injunction, Civil Case No. Q-45767 partakes of an action in personam.  In Domagas v. Jensen, we have explained the nature of an action in personam and enumerated some actions and proceedings which are in personam, viz:

“The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant.  Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him.  An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.”

The respondent judge's jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to the parties in the injunction suit. To stress, the petition for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-45767, was filed only by therein petitioners Augusto M. de Leon, Jose de Castro, Jose A. Panlilio, Felicidad Vergara Vda. De Pineda, Fernando L. Vitug I, Fernando M. Vitug II, Fernando M. Vitug III, and Faustino Tobia, and later amended to include Elena Ostrea and Feliza C. Cristobal-Generoso as additional petitioners therein, against Bishop Eraño Manalo, in his capacity as titular and spiritual head of I.N.K. Herein petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. never became parties thereto. Any and all orders and writs of execution, which the respondent judge may issue in that case can, therefore, be enforced only against those parties and not against the herein petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. In issuing the assailed Order dated 22 April 1998, which directed the issuance of the 2nd Alias Writ of Execution to eject non-parties (herein petitioners), the respondent judge clearly went out of bounds and committed grave abuse of discretion.

The nature of the injunction suit — Civil Case No. Q-45767 — as an action in personam in the RTC remains to be the same whether it is elevated to the CA or to this Court for review.  An action in personam does not become an action in rem just because a pronouncement confirming I.N.K.'s title to Lot 671 was made by this Court in the Calalang decision.  Final rulings may be made by this Court, as the Highest Court of the Land, in actions in personam but such rulings are binding only as against the parties therein and not against the whole world.  Here lies another grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge when he relied on the Calalang decision in his assailed Order dated 07 May 1998 as if it were binding against the whole world, saying:

“After evaluating the arguments of both parties, decisive on the incident is the decision of the Supreme Court in favor of the respondent I.N.K., represented by its titular and spiritual head Bishop Eraño G. Manalo, sustaining its ownership over the subject Lot 671. This Court could do no less but to follow and give substantial meaning to its ownership which shall include all dominical rights by way of a Writ of Execution. To delay the issuance of such writ is a denial of justice due the I.N.K.” 

As a final word, this decision shall not be misinterpreted as disturbing or modifying our ruling in Calalang.  The final ruling on I.N.K.'s ownership and title is not at all affected. Private respondent I.N.K., as the true and lawful owner of Lot 671 as ruled by the Court in Calalang, simply has to file the proper action against the herein petitioners to enforce its property rights within the bounds of the law and our rules.  I.N.K.'s recourse of asking for the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the petitioners in Civil Case No. Q-45767 and the respondent judge's orders in said case, granting I.N.K.'s prayer and enforcing the alias writ of execution against the present petitioners, constitutes blatant disregard of very fundamental rules and must therefore be stricken down.” (Emphases by the Supreme Court.)

To summarize and as a general rule then, a restraining order, like injunction, operates upon a person as it is granted in exercise of equity jurisdiction; it has no in rem effect.





Sunday, September 18, 2011

The controversial RTC judge and the matter of injunction and territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases

"Controversial Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 167 presiding judge Rolando Mislang has submitted his compliance to the Supreme Court's (SC) Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) order for him to explain his issuance of 2 temporary restraining orders (TRO) that halted preliminary investigation proceedings and the filing of information in a criminal case for syndicated estafa against Globe Asiatique (GA) Realty Holding Corporation's Delfin Lee.

In a 5-page letter-compliance addressed to Court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez, Mislang stressed the existence of a "prejudicial question" that warranted his issuance of the TROs." (http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/business/09/16/11/judge-mislang-defends-tro-ga-case)

Let us revisit then the Philippine Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence. The Rules of Court defines preliminary injunction as “an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.” (Section 1, Rule 58)

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. (Medina vs. Greenfield Development Corporation, 443 SCRA 150, 159).

To be entitled to injunction, plaintiff must be able to convincingly show that he is entitled to it; he has a right in esse, meaning it is present, clear and positive; it is neither future nor contingent; the act sought to be prevented or restrained would work grave, irreparable injury and great injustice upon plaintiff; and equity rests with him.

It has been settled that there is a limitation on the territorial reach of injunctions issued by the trial courts. Thus, in a recent case, the Supreme Court ruled that “respondent judge had no authority to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining acts performed outside his territorial jurisdiction. Respondent judge should have known that the injunctive writs he issued were enforceable only within his territorial jurisdiction, or any part, of the Third Judicial Region. In Civil Case No. 153-0-2006, the writ of injunction, which respondent judge issued, was directed against complainant, the Secretary and the Acting Deputy Customs Commissioner for Administration whose offices in Manila are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City.” (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2064. June 26, 2009)

Also, as a general rule, writ of injunction is not available in criminal cases. But this is subject to exceptions: e.g., when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; when the court has no jurisdiction; to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of suits; when double jeopardy is apparent; etc. (See Florenz Regalado. Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II.)

With respect to prejudicial question, it “generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.” (Sps. Jose vs. Sps. Suarez. G.R. No. 176795, June 30, 2008)